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TOURO LAW REVIEW
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Oyola64
(decided May 15, 1995)
Angel Oyola appealed his sentence on the ground that the
allowance of the victim's statement into testimony violated the
Due Process Clause of both the New York State65 and United
States 66 Constitutions due to the court's authorization of a
victim's impact statement at sentencing. 67 The Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the county court's ruling,
holding that the defendant's due process was not violated because
"[tihe psychological impact that the defendant's crime had on his
victim was undoubtedly a proper factor to be considered by the
County Court in imposing [the] sentence." 68 The court further
acknowledged that "[n]othing in the State or Federal
Constitutions prohibited the County Court from considering the
victim's own account of the defendant's crime in assessing the
true dimensions of this psychological impact." 69
The defendant, Angel Oyola, pled guilty to and was convicted
of rape in the first degree. 70 Pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law [hereinafter CPL] section 380.50(2)(b), 71 the
64. 215 A.D.2d 597, 626 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't 1995).
65. N.Y. CONST. amend. art. I, § 6. This section provides in relevant
part: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." Id.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This provision states in pertinent part:
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... " Id.
67. Oyola, 215 A.D.2d at 597-98, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
68. Id. at 597, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
69. Id. at 597-98, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
70. Id. at 597, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
71. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 380.50(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1995). This
provision provides in pertinent part:
(b) If the defendant is being sentenced for a felony the court, if
requested at least ten days prior to the sentencing date, shall accord the
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sentencing judge permitted the victim of the defendant's crime to
make a statement at the sentencing proceeding. 72 On appeal,
defendant contended that "CPL 380.50(2)(b) is unconstitutional
in that 'it serves no useful purpose in the sentencing process.,' 73
However, the court reasoned that one of the necessary factors
for the sentencing judge's consideration was the psychological
impact of the defendant's crime on his victim.74 Additionally, the
Oyola court considered whether the New York State or the
United States Constitution barred the victim's version of the
defendant's crime when determining the extent of the
psychological impact upon the victim.75 Relying on five cases,
the Oyola court concluded that "CPL 380.50(2)(b) advances a
legitimate State interest, and its application in this case did not
deprive the defendant of any of his constitutionally-guaranteed
rights. -76
The first case cited by the Oyola court, in support of the
proposition that CPL 380.50(2)(b) does not deprive the defendant
of any constitutionally-guaranteed rights, was Williams v. New
York. 77 Williams explored the methods available to a sentencing
victim the right to make a statement with regard to any matter relevant
to the question of sentence ....
Id.
72. Oyola, 215 A.D.2d 597, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
73. Id.
74. Oyo/a, 215 A.D.2d at 597, 626 N.Y.S.2d. at 850 (citing People v.
White, 192 A.D.2d 736, 597 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d Dep't 1993)).
75. Id. at 597-98, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
76. Id. at 598, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
77. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). In Williams, the defendant was convicted of
murder in the first degree and sentenced to life imprisonment by a New York
jury; however, the trial judge imposed the death penalty. Id. at 242. The
defendant argued that section 482 of the New York Criminal Code violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 243. Section 482 of the New York Criminal Code reads in pertinent
part: "Before rendering judgment or pronouncing sentence the court... may
seek any information that will aid in determining the proper treatment of such
defendant." Id. The Supreme Court held that the above section did not violate
the Constitution, reasoning that a sentencing judge should have the best and
most information available when determining a defendant's sentence. Id. at
249, 252.
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judge in order to acquire information that would aid in the
determination of an appropriate sentence for a convicted
defendant. 78 Recognizing that "New York judges are given a
broad discretion to decide the type and extent of punishment for
convicted defendants," 79 the Court explained that a sentencing
judge is authorized to contemplate information "obtained outside
the courtroom from persons whom a defendant has not been
permitted to confront or cross-examine. "80
Justice Black, writing for the majority, advised that different
evidentiary rules govern the trial and sentencing phases of the
action. 81 The policy behind the differing rules is to "prevent
tribunals concerned solely with the issue of guilt of a particular
offense from being influenced to convict for that offense by
evidence that the defendant had habitually engaged in other
misconduct." 82 The opinion continued: "Highly relevant if not
essential to [the sentencing court's] selection of an appropriate
sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible
concerning the defendant's life and characteristics." 83
Moreover, the court considered the opinions in People v.
Jones84 and People v. Wright,85 where both courts considered
78. Id. at 244-45.
79. Id. at 245.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 246.
82. Id. at 247.
83. Id.
84. 195 A.D.2d 482, 599 N.Y.S.2d 860 (2d Dep't 1993). In Jones, the
defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree and appealed his
sentence on the ground that the sentencing court's conversation with his
victim's brother was improper. Id. at 482-83, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 861. The
appellate division agreed that the Supreme Court, Kings County, erred by
speaking with the victim's brother. Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 390.30
(McKinney 1994) (providing that the victim's family can communicate their
sentiments to the court only via a written impact statement). The court found,
however, that there was no indication that the sentencing court was excessively
influenced by such conversation. Jones, 195 A.D.2d at 483, 599 N.Y.S.2d at
861.
85. 187 A.D.2d 1016, 590 N.Y.S.2d 365 (4th Dep't 1992). In Wright, the
defendant was convicted of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree, and
appealed his sentence on the ground that it was improper for the Niagara
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the extent that the victims' relatives' statements influenced the
sentencing determinations. 86 The defendant's sentence was
affirmed in Jones because the appellate court concluded there was
no indication "that the sentencing court was unduly influenced by
its conversation with the victim's brother." 87 Similarly, in
Wright, the defendant's sentence was also affirmed because the
improper communications between the court and the victim's
family were not so unduly influential to the sentencing court as to
compel the court to vacate the imposed sentence. 88
Furthermore, in People v. Lader,89 the Second Department
affirmed the defendant's sentence and rejected the defendant's
assertion that the sentencing court's conversations with some of
the defendant's victims violated his right to due process of law. 90
The court explained that "[tihe Sentencing Judge merely gave
those victims present the opportunity to express dissatisfaction
with her decision to grant an adjournment of the sentencing date
and to state what impact defendant's offenses had upon them." 9 1
Such action was not barred by the due process clause.
County Court to hold a private interview with the victim's family before the
imposition of the defendant's sentence. Id. at 1016, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 366. At
the time of the interview, CPL 380.50 was not amended to allow such
communications. Therefore, the appropriate means of communication would
have been a written victim impact statement. Id. at 1017, 590 N.Y.S.2d at
366. See N.Y. CRnl. PRoc. LAW § 390.30 (McKinney 1994).
86. People v. Qyola, 215 A.D.2d 597, 598, 626 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (2d
Dep't 1995). In both cases, the defendants failed to preserve for appellate
review the issue of whether the communications between the victims' relatives
and the respective courts violated their constitutionally-guaranteed rights.
Jones, 195 A.D.2d at 483, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 861; Wright, 187 A.D.2d at 1017,
590 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
87. Jones, 195 A.D.2d at 483, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
88. Wright, 187 A.D.2d at 1017, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
89. 114 A.D.2d 390, 494 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1985). In Lader, the
defendant pled guilty to and was convicted of grand larceny. The defendant
then appealed his sentence on the ground that his constitutionally-guaranteed
right to due process was violated by the communications between some of the
defendant's victims and the sentencing court. Id. at 390-92, 494 N.Y.S.2d at
34-36.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 393, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
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Finally, the court considered Payne v. Tennessee,92 where the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Constitution does not
operate as a per se bar to victim impact statements in a capital
sentencing jury case.93 In Payne, the Court declined to uphold
the principle established in Booth that victim impact evidence
should be barred at a capital sentencing proceeding. 94 Payne
expressly overruled the Court's earlier decision in Booth v.
Maryland.95
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the
reasoning in Booth, which provided that "victim impact evidence
must be excluded because it would be difficult, if not impossible,
for the defendant to rebut such evidence without shifting the
focus of the sentencing hearing away from the defendant, thus
creating a "'mini-trial' on the victim's character." 96
Furthermore, the Court declined to accept the Booth Court's
explanation that "[victim impact statements] create an
impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be
made in an arbitrary manner." ' 97 In its decision to overrule
92. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Payne, the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to death for the first degree murder of a mother and her two-year-
old daughter and first degree assault with intent to murder her three-year-old
son. Id. at 811. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing that the Eighth
Amendment is a per se bar prohibiting victim impact statements in a capital
jury sentencing case. Id. at 816. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tennessee
Supreme Court's decision and held that the Eighth Amendment is not a per se
bar prohibiting victim impact statements from consideration during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. Id. at 830.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 830.
95. 482 U.S. 496 (1989), overruled by, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Booth,
the defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder, robbery and
conspiracy to commit robbery. Id. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the
prosecution introduced a victim impact statement, pursuant to a Maryland
statute, which required consideration of such a statement. Id. The Supreme
Court held that the introduction of a victim impact statement at the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial violated the defendant's rights under the Eighth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution and ruled that the Maryland statute
was invalid. Id. at 509.
96. Payne, 501 U.S. at 823 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07).
97. Id. at 819 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
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Booth, the Payne Court also acknowledged that the Booth opinion
was a five to four decision. 98
Applying these principles to Oyola, the court considered the
interest of the State in providing information to the sentencing
court with regard to the psychological impact upon the victim.9 9
The Oyola court denied defendant's request for resentencing
opining that "CPL 380.50(2)(b) advances a legitimate State
interest, and its application in this case did not deprive the
defendant of any of his constitutionally-guaranteed rights." 10 0
The court concluded that "[t]he terms of CPL 380.50(2)(b)
advance the State's 'legitimate interest in * * * reminding the
sentencer that just as the [convicted criminal] should be
considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual.'" 10 1
As the Oyola decision points out, the New York Due Process
Clause goes only as far as the Federal Due Process Clause in
protecting a convicted defendant from the arbitrary sentencing so
often involved with victim impact statements.
SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Bradstreet v. Sobo I102
(decided July 17, 1995)
Plaintiff contended that defendant's regulation prohibiting
home-schooled students from participating in interscholastic
sports constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
98. Id. at 817.
99. People v. Oyola, 215 A.D.2d 597, 598, 626 N.Y.S.2d 849, 850 (2d
Dep't 1995).
100. Id.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. 165 Misc. 2d 931, 630 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1995).
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